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Statutory Multiple Punishment and Multiple
Prosecution Protection: AnlAnalysis of
Minnesota Statute Section 609.035
In 1963, the Minnesota legislature enacted a statute pro-
hibiting multiple prosecution and punishment where a
person's conduct constitutes more than one statutory
offense. This statute was designed largely to reverse the
course of decisions under constitutional double jeopardy
provisions and a predecessor statute which afforded in-
adequate protection to defendants. The author of this
Note first considers the policies underlying double jeopar-
dy protection and the inadequacies of earlier judicial
decisions. He then analyzes the Minnesota statute and
suggests guidelines for resolving issues yet to be faced by
the Minnesota courts. In conclusion, he suggests that the
Minnesota Supreme Court should assume a strong role
in assuring strict compliance with the statute, and pro-
poses further legislation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine prohibiting double jeopardy is intended to pro-
tect defendants against multiple punishment as well as multiple
prosecution for the same offense.' Originating in the common
law,2 the doctrine is incorporated in the fifth amendment to the
federal constitutions and in most state constitutions.4 The con-
1. See, e.g., Bz parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 168, 178 (1873); Neal v.
State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 857 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 823 (1961); State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 818 (1959);
People v. Savarese, 1 Misc. 2d 805, 114 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
About twelve states have express statutory prohibitions against both multi-
ple prosecution and multiple punishment. See ALI, ADnNmTRaATioN OF THE
ViRPD.AL LAw: DouBLE JEOPARDY 128-29 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1932); N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 1938.
Nevertheless, those states which have only constitutional prohibitions
treat 'the imposition of multiple punishment as double jeopardy. See Bragan v.
State, 243 Ala. 102, 9 So. 2d 123 (1942); Viel v. Potter, 20 Conn. Sup. 173, 129
A.2d 230 (C.P. 1957); State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951).
2. See Note, 75 YA L.J. 262 n.1 (1965).
3. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb." In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937),
the Supreme Court refused to extend federal double jeopardy standards to
the states by incorporation within the fourteenth amendment. The Court
indicated, however, that a flagrant violation of the double jeopardy guarantee
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stitutional protection against double jeopardy has, however,
proved largely illusory. First, courts have tended to ignore the
different policies underlying multiple prosecution and multiple
punishment protection, thereby producing an illogical and incon-
sistent body of case law Second, in determining what is the
same "offense," courts have focussed on the statutory provisions
allegedly violated and the evidence necessary to a conviction
under each provision rather than on the defendant's behavior.7
With the proliferation of statutory offenses," this approach makes
it possible for a defendant to be prosecuted and punished several
times for a single behavioral incident.9 Finally, a number of ex-
ceptions to the general rule permit multiple prosecution and pun-
ishment for what is concededly the same offense.' °
Legislation designed to implement the policies underlying con-
stitutonal double jeopardy provisions has been enacted in some
states." Such a statute was adopted in Minnesota in the 1963
might violate the fourteenth amendment, and subsequent cases have assumed
that the fourteenth amendment imposes some limitations on state power to
reprosecute. See United States cx rel. Hetenyl v. Willdns, 348 F.2d 841 (9d Cir.
1965) and cases discussed id. at 851-58. Since the Palko decision, it has been
held that other guarantees of the Bill of Rights have been absorbed by the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-
incrimination clause of fifth amendment). At least one federal court has sug-
gested that -the process of selective incorporation should extend to the basic
core of the double jeopardy guarantee, United States ex rel. Hetenyl v. Wil-
kins, tupra.
4. All states except Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Caroli-
na, and Vermont have constitutional double jeopardy provisions. These five
states consider the double jeopardy protection part of their common law. See
ALI, ADMmusTRATioN OF THm CR nh rAL LAw: DouBLE JEOPARDY 56-59 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1932).
5. See Comley, Former Jeopardy, 35 YAhz L. 3. 674, 675 (1926); Note, 24
MiN. L. :Rv. 522 (1940).
6. See notes 13-16 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 17-23 infra and accompanying text.
8. See Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE
LJ. 513, 514-16 (1949); Mayers & Yarborough, Bis Vexari" New Trials and
Successive Prosecutions, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 1, 29 (1960); Note, 65 YAE L.E .
339, 344 (1956).
9. See Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21
MNw. L. REv. 805 (1937). See also Note, 7 BRooxmiN L. REv. 79, 82 (1937);
Note, 11 STrx. L. REv. 735, 741 (1959). In State v. Huntsman, 115 Ulfah 288,
204 Pac. 448 (1949), the defendant was charged with adultery, incest, forni-
cation, rape, and carnal knowledge -all on the basis of a single act of inter-
course.
10. See notes 28-31 infra and accompanying text.
11. See statutes cited in ALI, ADnmwsTRATioN OF THE CmnlAL LAw:
Dou3L JEopmmY, 128-29 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1932).
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revision of the Criminal Code.'2 This Note will analyze section
609.035 and suggest guidelines for its interpretation and solutions
for some of the problems arising under the new statutory
approach.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Separate policies underlie the constitutional prohibitions
against multiple prosecution and multiple punishment for the
"9same offense." The restriction on multiple punishment has a
substantive goal of insuring that defendant's punishment is com-
mensurate with his criminal culpability. The bar on multiple
prosecution is designed to -accomplish the procedural objectives
of relieving defendants from the threat of repeated prosecutions,
establishing the finality of one prosecution, and protecting both
defendants and the public from the waste of both money and time
through consolidation of prosecutions.'3
Because of the difference in the policies underlying the two
protections, it has often been suggested that different tests should
be used to determine their availability.14 But courts have ignored
this distinction and have applied identical definitional tests to
determine whether the "same offense" was made the basis for
reprosecution or multiple punishment.' 5 The resulting body of
case law is wholly irreconcilable. 16
In attempting to solve the key problem of what is the "same
offense," courts have employed two distinct analytical methods: 17
the "same evidence" approach and the "same transaction" ap-
proach. The federal courts and a majority of state courts rely on
12. M n. STAT. ANN. § 609.085 (1964).
13. See Note, 65 YALE LJ. 339, 89-41 (1956). See also Bigelow, Former
Conviction and Former Acquittal, 11 RuRos L. Rv. 487, 497 (1956); Lugar,
Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy, and Res Judicata, 89 IowA L. Rnv. S17, 845-
47 (1954); Note, 49 Mnuw. L. Rsv. 738 (1965); Note, 75 YA. L.J. 262, 266-67
(1965).
14. See Kirchheimer, supra note 8; Note, 11 STAN. L. Ruv. 785 (1959);
Note, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965); Note, 65 Ykz LJ. 889 (1956).
15. See Note, 11 STAN. L. REv. 785, 740 n.24 (1959); Note, 65 YAE L.J.
39, 347-48 (1956).
16. See Lugar, mupra note 18, at 328; Note, 7 BRooxmsy L. REV. 79, 88
(1937); Note, 11 STAN. L. REv. 735, 745 (1959); Note, 65 YAE L.J. 389, 344
(1956); MODEL PENAL CoD. § 1.08, comment at 36-37 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1956).
17. See ALI, ADnNISTRATION OF THE CRImNAL LAw: DOUBLE JEoPA TY
27-33 (same offense), 39-61 (same transaction) (Official Draft 1935); Xirch-
heimer, supra note 8; Lugar, supra note 18.
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some variation of the former,18 which originated in The King v.
Vandercomb, 9 and was adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Gaviere8 v. United State,:20 "A single act may be an
offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of
an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or con-
viction under either statute does not exempt defendant from
prosecution and punishment under the other. 2' 1
With the ever-expanding number of statutory offenses which
can be charged on the basis of essentially unitary behavior,= this
approach makes it possible for the resourceful prosecutor to sub-
ject a defendant to multiple prosecutions for various statutory
violations arising out of a single unit of conduct, and to obtain
separate consecutive sentences for each infraction. 8 The approach
18. Typical formulations of this test include the following: (1) offenses are
not the same unless defendant could have been convicted at the first trial by
proof of facts necessary to convict at the second, see State v. Mldgett, 214
N.C. 107, 198 SE. 618 (1938); State v. Labato, 7 NJ. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951);
The King v. Vandercomb, 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796); (2) offenses
are not the same unless evidence of either offense would be sufficient for con-
viction of the other, see Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 483 (1871); State
v. Shoopman, 11 N.J. 838, 94 A. d 493 (1953); State v. Empey, 65 Utah 609,
289 Pac. 25 (1925); (8) offenses are not the same unless defendant could
have been convicted of the same offense on the evidence required at -the first
trial, see State v. Brownrigg, 87 Me. 500, 88 Atl. 11 (1895); and (4) offenses are
not the same unless they are identical in law and fact, see Burton v. United
States, 202 U.S. 844 (1906). Further variations under the same evidence ap-
proach may occur depending upon the level at which the courts require the evi-
dentiary similarities to exist-in the proof at the trials, in the allegations of
the indictments, or in the statutory definitions of the crimes. See Note, 49
MnmN. L. Rzv. 788, 789 n.7 (1965); Note, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 269-70 (1965).
19. 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796). The rule of this case appears to
have been dictated at least in part by a desire to compensate for the strict
common law pleading rules under which the slightest variance between the
allegation and proof was fatal to the prosecution. Note, 75 YALE LJ. 262, 270
(1965). This variance problem has largely vanished. See, e.g., State v. Healy,
186 Min. 264, 161 N.W. 590 (1917). At any rate, it cannot be Telied upon
to justify the same evidence test in a former conviction case, since variance
is a harmful technicality only when it results in an acquittal. See Note, 75
YA&n LJ. 262, 274 & n.55 (1965).
20. 220 U.S. 388 (1911). Accord, Harris v. United States, 859 U.S. 19
(1959); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1982); Ebeling v. Morgan,
237 U.S. 625 (1915). But cf. Petite v. United States, 861 U.S. 529 (1960).
Several states follow this formula. See, e.g., State v. Lawrence, 146 Me. 360, 82
A.2d 90 (1951); State v. Leibowitz, 29 NJ. 102, 123 A.2d 526 (1956).
21. 220 U.S. at 842.
22. See authorities cited note 8, supra.
93. See Lugar, supra note 13, at 319 n.10; Note, 7 BnooxL- L. R!v. 79,
82 (1937).
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is therefore inadequate to implement the policies underlying
double jeopardy provisions.
Some state courts have been persuaded to depart from this
restrictive treatment of double jeopardy by employing a "same
transaction" approach 24 Focussing on the defendant's conduct
rather than upon evidence or statutes, these courts prohibit sepa-
rate prosecution and punishment for violations -arising out of a
single unit of conduct. Tests for determining whether conduct is
unitary -are based upon acts, transactions, or the actor's intent
and objective.2 5
Strict application of the same evidence test frequently has led to absurd
results. In Hoag v. New Jersey, 856 U.S. 464 (1958), the defendant was tried
on three counts for robbing A, B, -nd C in a -single transaction. His acquittal
was held no bar to a subsequent prosecution for cobbing D in the same trans-
action. In Ciucci v. Illinois, 8 I1. 2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40 (1956), aff'd per
curiam, 356 U.S. 571 (1958), the defendant was charged with murdering his
wife and three children by setting fire to their home. He was separately tried
three times, each time for the murder of a different member of his family, and
in each trial all four murders were introduced into evidence. The prosecutor,
dissatisfied with the penalties imposed by the first two juries, was finally able
to get a death sentence on the third conviction. Cases not involving multiple
victims have also reached ridiculous results. In Johnson v. Commonwealth,
201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 888 (1923), the court held that defendant could be
prosecuted separately for each of 75 hands of poker played at one sitting.
In Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625 (1915), the Supreme Court upheld sepa-
rate and consecutive sentences for robbing each of six mail bags.
The prosecutor's discretion as to how many violations to charge is largely
immune from judicial review. See Remington & Joseph, Charging, Convicting,
and Sentencing the Multiple Criminal Offender, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 528, 530
n.6. The following states have been listed as applying the same transaction
test: Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia. Lugar, supra note 13, at 828 n.26.
24. It should be noted, however, that even these states apply the test
sporadically and inconsistently. Compare State v. Cooper, 18 N.J-.. 861 (Sup.
Ct. 1833); with State v. Hoag, 35 N.J. Super. 555, 114 A.2d 573 (1955), aff'd,
21 NJ. 496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
A parallel development is -the extension to criminal cases of the collateral
estoppel doctrine prohibiting elitigation of matters once finally determined
between the same parties. See, e.g., Seafon v. United States, 382 U.S. 575
(1948); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916). It should be noted
that collateral estoppel provides no protection against multiple punishment
in a single trial. The protection it affords from successive prosecution normal-
ly does not exceed that accorded by ,the same transaction approach. See
People v. De Sisto, 27 Misc. 2d 217, 238, 214 N.Y.S.2d 858, 883-84 (Sup. Ct.
1961), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. People v. Lo Cicero, 17 App. Div. 2d
31, 230 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1969); 47 MmN. L. Ruv. 273, 276-77 (1962). See gen-
erally Lugar, supra note 12, at 329-47; Mayers & Yarborough, supra note 8,
at 29-43.
25. See Note, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 270 (1965).
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Commentators generally agree the same transaction approach
provides needed protection against the harassment and cost of
multiple trials. However, it has been criticized as inappropriate
for determining the substantive question of multiple punshment. 26
In addition, the vagueness of the standard - "same transaction"
could conceivably encompass any span of conduct - has led to
sporadic and inconsistent application of the test in jurisdictions
which purport to follow it. 7
The problem of determining which violations constitute the
same offense is further complicated by a number of recognized
exceptions which allow otherwise prohibited multiple prosecution
and multiple punishment. Additional prosecution and punishment
have been allowed where: (1) the act is an offense against two or
more persons; 28 (2) the victim of defendant's wrongdoing dies
after the first prosecution; 9 (3) the act violates the criminal laws
of different jurisdictions; 0 and (4) the first court had no jurisdic-
tion to prosecute for the offense charged in the subsequent prose-
cution. 1
26. See authorities cited note 14 supra.
27. See Note, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 276 (1965).
28. See, e.g., Holder v. Fraser, 215 Ark. 67, 219 S.W.2d 625 (1949); People
v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138, 3 Pac. 597 (1884); People v. Ciucci, 8 III. 2d 619,
137 N.E.2d 40 (1956). Contra, e.g., Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169
(1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955); State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa
1428, 250 N.W. 617 (1933); Crocker v. State, 204 Tenn. 615, 325 S.W.2d 234
(1959).
29. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912); Territory v.
Nihipali, 40 Hawaii 331 (1953); State v. Randolph, 61 Idaho 456, 102 P.2d 913
(1940). See generally Note, 24 M-NN. L. REv. 522, 545-56 (1940).
30. See generally Note, 24 Mmuwm. L. RLv. 522, 540-43 (1940). This excep-
tion is most often applied with respect to successive prosecutions for state
and federal offenses. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959);
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). Occasionally the exception has been
applied to conduct that violates both a municipal ordinance and a state law.
See, e.g., State v. Garner, 360 Mo. 50, 226 S.W.2d 604 (1950); State v. Hauser,
187 Neb. 138, 288 N.W. 518 (1939). And, even less frequently, the exception
is applied to concurrent state jurisdiction. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Oregon, 212
U.S. 315 (1909); Strobhar v. State, 55 Fla. 167, 47 So. 4 (1908).
With respect Io the federal-state overlap, it should be noted that since
Bartkus and Abbate the Justice Department has established a policy of not
bringing a subsequent prosecution where there has been a previous trial on the
state level. MEMOa._NDUl TO THE UNrrI STATES ATTOmnys, Department of
Justice Press Release, April 6, 1959 as cited in Note, 75 YAL L.J. 262, 264
n.10 (1965). Cf., Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960).
A few states have enacted statutes which prohibit prosecution after con-
viction or acquittal in another jurisdiction. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.035 (1964); MODEL PENAL CoDE § 111, comment at 62 (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1956).
31. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912); State v. Barnette,
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MI. MINNESOTA'S STATUTORY APPROACH TO
DOUBLE JEOPARDY: SECTION 609.085
In 1963, the legislature enacted section 609.035 which provides:
Except as provided in section 609.585,32 if a person's conduct con-
stitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state he may be
punished for only one of such offenses and a conviction or acquittal of
any one of them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them. All
such offenses may be included in one prosecution which shall be stated
in separate courts.
This section, like traditional double jeopardy doctrines, offers
two distinct protections. The first clause prohibits multiple punish-
ment for statutory violations arising out of a defendant's single
unit of conduct, and the second clause bars reprosecution for any
violation subsequent to an acquittal or conviction on another
such violation. The last sentence allows joinder of all such viola-
tions in one prosecution.
A. GumEmLns FOR INTERPRTATiON OF SECTION 609.035
It is clear that section 609.035 was intended to expand double
jeopardy protection.3m Former section 610.21,14 which spoke in
158 Me. 117, 179 A.2d 800 (1962); People v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 183
N.W. 177 (1921); State v. Shoopman, 11 N.J. 383, 94 A.2d 493 (1953). The
rationale of these decisions is that the defendant was not in jeopardy of con-
viction of the larger offense prior to the second trial. Other authorities point
out that while defendant was not in jeopardy of conviction or punishment for
the greater offense at both prosecutions, he was in jeopardy of conviction or
punishment for the lesser offense at both prosecutions when the larger offense
included the smaller. State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 N.W. 473 (1912);
see Note, 24 Mwq. L. Ruv. 522, 544-45 (1940).
8n. Mmm. STAT. AwN. § 609.585 (1964), provides, "A prosecution for or
conviction of the crime of burglary is not a bar to conviction of any other
crime committed on entering or while in the 'building entered." The constitu-
tionality of the exception created -by the predecessor to this statube was sus-
tained in State v. Robinson, 260 Minn. 79, 114 N.W.2d 737 (1962); State v.
Hackett, 47 M inn. 425, 50 N.W. 472 (1891).
33. See Advisory Committee Comment, 40 Mnwu. STAT. ANw. § 609.035, at
57-58 (1964).
34. "Any act or omission declared criminal and punishable in different ways
by different provisions of law shall be punished under only one of such pro-
visions, and a conviction or acquittal under any one shall bar a prosecution for
the same act or omission under any other provision." Minn. Rev. Laws 1905,
§ 4765, as amended.
Although the term "conduct" replaced the term "act or omission," it




terms of a defendant's "act or omission," could have been read to
provide the same protection; according -to the drafters of the new
statute, that statute was intended to govern when "a single be-
havioral incident resulted in the violation of more than one crimi-
nal statute." 5 Except for some early cases, however, Minnesota
decisions tended to defeat this alleged purpose2s
Initially the Minnesota Supreme Court appeared committed
to the same transaction approach, although its decisions were
not based upon the former statute. Thus, in State v. Moore, 7 the
court held that conviction for uttering a forged mortgage barred
prosecution for uttering a forged note to secure the mortgage at
the same time. In State v. Klugherz,88 acquittal for making a
forged note was held to bar prosecution for uttering the note as a
part of the same transaction. Both opinions emphasized that
under the constitutional provision, a single act or transaction
could constitute but one offense.
In State v. Oberman,9 the court's emphasis shifted from trans-
actions to offenses. Although it found keeping liquor for sale and
selling the liquor to be separate and distinct acts subject to sepa-
rate prosecution, the decision appears to rest on the fact that
separately defined violations were involved.40
Subsequent decisions expressly rejected the same transaction
approach. In State v. Fredlund,;4 successive prosecutions were per-
mitted for causing each of two deaths in an ,auto collision. The
court found no constitutional prohibition against successive prose-
cutions where "the wrongful act is the cause of separate and dis-
tinct offenses,"' ' and reasoned that "proof of the death of [one
victim] ... cannot possibly acquit or convict defendant of the
killing of the [other]." 48
85. Advisory Committee Comment, 40 Mmx. STAT. ANN. § 609.035, at
57-58 (1964).
86. See ibid.
87. 86 Minn. 422, 90 N.W. 787 (1902).
88. 91 Minn. 406, 98 N.W. 99 (1904).
39. 152 Minn. 431, 189 N.W. 444 (1922).
40. "It may be necessary or desirable to show sales in -rder -to prove that
the liquor was kept for sale, but it does not follow from that fact that the
offenses are identical. They dearly are not." 152 Minn. at 438, 189 N.W. at
445.
41. 200 Iinn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937).
42. Id. at 50, 278 N.W. at 856.
43. Ibid. The court dismissed the Moore and Klugherz decisions in a
sentence: "We think a careful reading of the eases mentioned leads to the view
that the question here presented has not heretofore been decided by this
court." Id. at 54, 273 N.W. at 358.
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In State v. Winger," acquittal of rape was held no bar to prose-
cution for carnally knowing and abusing a minor by the same act.
The court reasoned that upon the first prosecution there could be
no conviction of the crime charged in the second, and, without
referring to section 610.21, stated "the words 'same offense' mean
same offense, not the same transaction, not the same acts, not
the same circumstances or same situation. 45
Implicit in all these cases was a view of section 610.21 first
stated in State v. Thompson4 6 There, after holding constitutional
double jeopardy protection was not a bar to successive prose-
cutions of a public official for refusing to turn over public funds
to his successor and for misappropriation of the same funds, the
court considered the effect of section 610.21:
This statute implements the constitutional provision against double
jeopardy, Minn. Const. art. 1, § 7, but adds nothing to the scope of the
prohibition therein contained. It is apparent that, in using the words
act and omission, the legislature was using them in the restricted and
consequential sense of a single and separate offense.47
Thus, the Minnesota court read the same evidence approach into
section 610.21, ignoring a clear legislative intention to expand
double jeopardy protection.
Since the enactment of section 609.035, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has indicated a willingness to apply it more broadly than
its predecessor.4 Recognizing that most prior decisions were in-
consistent with the policy expressed by section 610.21, the court
has accepted a legislative intention to change the effect of the
statutory prohibition.49
A number of factors support this result. First, the term "con-
duct" suggests a factual rather than an evidentiary test. 0 Second,
The whole tenor of the Fredlund opinion seems to be that an obviously
guilty defendant should not escape punishment. It should be noted that al-
though the question was not before the court, the 'tate had submitted a
supplemental record and brief on the point that an acquittal obtained fraudu-
lently, here assertedly by -the testimony of witnesses who bad pleaded guilty
to perjury, should not bar another trial. Note, 24 mix-. L. Rnv. 522, 555 &
n.197 (1940).
44. 204 Minn. 164, 282 N.W. 819 (1938).
45. Id. at 167, 282 N.W. at 821.
46. 241 Mlnn. 59, 62 N.W.2d 51P (1954).
47. Id. at 66, 69 N.W.2d at 518.
48. See State v. Reiland, 142 N.W.2d 685 (Minn. 1966); State v. Johnson,
141 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1966); City of Bloomington v. Kossow, 269 Minm.
467, 181 N.Wad 206 (1964).
49. See State v. Johnson, supra note 47, at 522-23.
50. Id. at 521-24.
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the Advisory Committee's comment,51 strongly suggesting a
broader test, is indicative of legislative intent.52 Finally, section
609.0413 confers fully as much protection as the prior case law
by prohibiting additional prosecution or punishment for a crime
necessarily proved if another crime charged is proved. Given this
provision, the only utility of section 609.035 is to provide protec-
tion from multiple prosecution and punishment in situations
where the defendant's conduct constitutes multiple offenses, none
of which is necessarily proved by proof of another.5 4
B. WHAT Is A 'TRsoN's CoiN-ucT"?
The Minnesota court has already addressed itself to the
threshold question: should the term "conduct" receive identical
definition whether protection is sought against multiple prosecu-
tion or against multiple punishment. Although, because of the
different policies underlying the two protections, it would be rea-
sonable to utilize different tests,55 the court was persuaded from
the wording of the statute that the legislature intended a single
standard."6
51. 40 M IN. STAT. ANx. 57-58 (1964).
52. See State v. Johnson, 141 N.W.2d 517, 521-22 (Minn. 1966).
53.
Subdivision 1. Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be con-
victed of either the crime charged or an included crime, but not both.
An included crime may be any of the following:
(1) A lesser degree of the same crime; or
(2) An attempt to commit the crime charged; or
(8) An attempt to commit a lesser degree of the same crime; or
(4) A crime necessarily proved if the crime charged was proved.
Subd. 2. A conviction or acquittal of a crime is a bar to further
prosecution of any included crime, or other degree of the same crime.
Mmw[l. STAT. ANw. § 609.04 (1964).
54. See State v. Johnson, 141 N.W.2d 517, 521 (min. 1966). For com-
parisons of the language and scope of protection of California provisions com-
parable to f§ 609.04 and 609.035, see Note, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 853 (1962);
Note, 2 SAw Dma-o L. Rv. 86 (1965). It is important to note that California's
counterpart to § 609.04 does not purport 'to prevent multiple punishment and
its protection against multiple prosecution attaches earlier than that of §
609.04. See CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1023.
55. See authorities cited note 14, 8upra; Note, 50 CALir. L. REv. 853, 862
(1962).
56.
mhe application of the prohibitions [multiple prosecution and multiple
punishment] turns on the same determination - whether the "person's
conduct constitutes more -than one offense." Stated another way, a de-
fendant can neither be punished nor prosecuted more than once where
1111
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Recognizing the imprecision of the term "conduct," the Ad-
visory Committee drew the section with a view to incorporating
California and New York decisions interpreting similar statutes."7
These states have developed a body of law providing significantly
broader protection than that afforded by the Minnesota decisions
under section 610.21.
New York and California courts have usually utilized a test
focussing upon the intent and objective of the actor55 Little weight
his "conduct constitutes more than one offense'..... [I]t seems logi-
cally inescapable that the test for applying protection from multiple
prosecutions and protection from double punishment is the same ....
State v. Johnson, 141 N.W.2d 517,521,528 (Minn. 1966).
The court nevertheless recognized that because 'the clauses are based upon
different policies, defendant's waiver of protection against multiple prosecutions
does not necessarily constitute a waiver of protection against multiple punish-
ment. Id. at 525-26.
Despite dictum in Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 1, 857 P.9,d 839, 844-45,
9 Cal. Rptr. 607, 612-13 (1960), leaving open the possibility of different
tests for multiple prosecution and multiple punishment under California's
similar statute, commentators feel the same test will be applied to both pro-
tections under that statute. See Note, 50 CA w. L. Rnv. 853, 862 (1962); Note,
17 HASTINGS L.S. 58, 69 (1965); Note, 11 STAN. L. RLV. 735, 747 & n.50 (1959).
57. See 40 MmNw. STAT. A N. 58 (1964). Courts in states without similar
statutes rest their decisions on an entirely different basis. See People v. De
Sisto, 27 Mise. 2d 217,214 N.Y.S.2d 858, 876 (Sup. Ct.), Tev'd on other grounds
sub nom. People v. Lo Cicero, 17 App. Div. 2d 31, 280 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1962).
An argument can be made that the term "conduct" should be interpreted
more broadly than the term "act or omission" used 'in the California and New
York statutes. See CA. PEm. CoDm § 654; N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1938. However,
courts in those states appear to equate "act or omission" with a course of
conduct, see, e.g., Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 857 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607
(1960). It is clear the Advisory Committee intended to go no further than
the incorporation of such decisions.
58. See Seiterle v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 897, 369 P.d 6, 20 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1962); Neal v. State, supra note 57; People v. De Sisto, supra note 57;
People v. Savarese, 1 Misc. 2d 305, 114 N.Y.S.Qd 816 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
In Neal, the California Supreme Court established this guideline:
Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives
rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on
the intent and objective of the actor. If all the offenses were incident
to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such
offenses but not for more than one.
55 Cal. 2d at 15, 857 P.2d at 848-44, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12. This remains the
test predominantly used by the California courts, see, e.g., People v. Quinn,
61 Cal. 2d 551, S93 P.2d 705, 39 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1964); People v. McFarland,
58 Cal. d 748, 376 P.9,d 449, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, (1962); Seiterle v. Superior
Court, supra; 'although numerous other tests have tlso been relied upon.
See Meissack, Recent Developments in the Criminal Law: The Included
Offense Doctrine in California, 10 U.CL.A. L. Rav. 870, 885 (1963). A recent
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is placed on his physical movements.P9 The number of times a
defendant may be prosecuted or punished is measured by the
number of intentions or dominant purposes with which he has
acted6 0
On its face, the "intent and objective" test has a number of
defects. The criteria of intent and objective seem to have no
foundation in statutory language, since the words "act" and "con-
duct" suggest a test that looks to defendant's physical move-
ments!'1 Moreover, it is difficult, both as an evidentiary and a
psychological problem, to determine the number of a defendant's
intents and objectives.62 In fact, the criminal often lacks a specific
intent and objective when planning his criminal conduct and
rarely considers "such matters as sudden interruptions by third
parties and alternative means of perpetration, escape, or conceal-
ment."6 As a result, predictability and uniformity of punishment
are compromised by the test. A related objection is that the test
arbitrarily favors the defendant who developed a broad intent and
objective prior to engaging in his course of criminal conduct, and
penalizes the defendant who narrowly viewed the purposes of his
criminal activity.64 Finally, while the test would seem to provide
decision by the New York Court of Appeals, however, appears to have re-
jected the intent and objective test formulated by an inferior court in
People v. Savarese, 8upra. In holding that a prosecution for reckless driving
did not bar a subsequent prosecution for vehicular homicide, the plurality
opinion stated that § 1938 of the Penal Code goes no further than the con-
stitutional standard of "same offense." Martinis v. Supreme Court, 15
N.Y.2d 240, 206 N.E.2d 165, 258 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1965), 79 HARv. L. Rnv. 483.
In view of the presently confused state of New York law and the varied
tests applied by the California courts, it is significant that the Advisory Com-
mittee Comment cited Neal and Savarese as representative of the law intend-
ed to be incorporated. See 40 Mmrr. STAT. Aw. 58 (1964).
59. See 2 SAw D=Go L. REv. 86, 91 (1965).
60. In Neal, for example, the defendant attempted to kill his victims by
igniting their bed after soaking it with gasoline. The defendant was charged
with two counts of attempted murder and one count of arson. The court held
California's statute barred punishment for both arson and attempted murder
because the arson was incidental to the single dominant purpose of the
actor-killing his victims.
61. See People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748, 765-68, 876 P.2d 449, 465-
67, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 489-91 (1962) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
62. See ibid; Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act,
21 Mniw. L. REv. 805, 813 (1937).
68. People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748, 768, 876 P.2d 449, 467, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 478, 491 (1962) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
64. 17 HASTnGS L. T. 5s, 61 (1965). See also, Seiterle v. Superior Court, 57
Cal. 2d 397, 403, 369 P.2d 697, 700-01, 20 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-5 (1962) (concurring
and dissenting opinion).
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proper protection from multiple prosecution, its criteria are un-
related to the question of whether the state intended cumulative
punishment for separately defined offenses0 5 The last objection,
however, applies to any concept which looks to behavior rather
than to substantive statutes to measure the scope of protection
against consecutive punishment. Given the language of section
609.035, the wisdom of applying a behavior-oriented approach is
no longer open to question. 6
The only remaining question is whether intent and objective
are the proper criteria to effectuate this legislative decision. The
language of section 609.035 provides support for a test emphasiz-
ing the equal importance of three behavioral factors - singleness
of intended purpose, unity of time, and unity of place.67 The word
"conduct" suggests a concept of physical action, bounded in time
and space. Such an approach would explicitly recognize the tech-
nique adopted by courts purporting to use the intent and objective
test exclusively. That is, time -and place are viewed as objective
criteria which enable the court to determine singleness of intent.6
Use of these objective criteria would make the intent test less
elusive and provide more certain guidelines. Similarly it would
reduce the possibility of arbitrarily favoring the defendant with
the broader criminal intent.
In State v. Johnson,"" the Minnesota court recognized that
many offenses do not have intent as an element. Cases involving
such offenses require a substitute for the factors of intent and
objective, such as "the singleness of the conduct or behavioral
incident" as manifested by "an indivisible state of mind or co-
incident errors of judgment. °70 However, the test formulated in
Johnson would rely heavily on intent and objective when intent
is an essential element of the crime charged:
The cases from other jurisdictions and comments of the advisory com-
mittee suggest that, apart from the factors of time and place, the
essential ingredient of any test is whether the segment of conduct in-
volved was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objec-
five.71
Although this language may be interpreted as placing undue em-
phasis upon the factor of intent, it should be noted that the court
65. See Note, 65 YAa ,J. 339, 348 passim (1956).
66. See Sfate v. Reiland, 142 N.W.2d 635 (M inn. 1966); note 56 8upra and
accompanying text.
67. See Pirsig, Comment to § 609.035, 40 MmN. STAT. ANN. 59 (1994).
68. See H1orack, 8upra note 60, at 818-19.
69. 141 N.W.2d 517 (Wimn. 1966).




referred with approval to the Advisory Committee comment citing
cases which utilize additional factors 2 Thus, it appears reason-
able to conclude that the Minnesota court will give equal con-
sideration to time, place, and intent.
The application of this test may be illustrated by the follow-
ing hypothetical situations: (1) Defendant breaks into a home
while the family is on vacation and steals some goods. In this
situation because the offense of breaking and entry was necessary
to accomplish defendant's single purpose or plan to steal and both
offenses occurred within a close relationship of time and place, he
would initially appear entitled to assert the protection of section
609.035. However, the single exception to section 609.035 permits
multiple prosecution and punishment for burglary and other
crimes committed on entering or while in the building." (2) lJpon
entering the home, defendant encounters the maid and rapes her.
In this instance, defendant's three offenses - burglary, theft, and
rape - were accomplished within the outer limits established by
time and place, but the rape was not incident or necessary to de-
fendant's plan to rob. Thus, section 609.035 would not preclude
separate trials and consecutive punishments. (3) Defendant and
another man planned the theft three days in advance and executed
it together. The three offenses committed - burglary, theft, and
conspiracy - were motivated by a single purpose, to steal, and
were incident or necessary to that end; however, the conspiracy
lacked a close relationship of time and place to the burglary and
theft. Thus, the defendants would not be entitled to the section's
protection."
IV. PROBLEMS CREATED BY SECTION 609.035
Some additional problems arising under section 609.035 may be
illustrated by the use of the following hypothetical situation:
While attempting to evade the police, defendant drove -through
a 30 mile per hour zone at 60 miles per hour in the left lane, ignor-
7. 141 N.W.2d at 521-23.
73. See note 32 sUpra and accompanying text.
74. Although several writers have questioned the propriety of treating
conspiracy as a separately punishable offense, see, e.g., Note, 11 STAx. L. Rv.
785, 756-57 (1959), it does not appear reasonable to conclude that § 609.035
was intended to bar separate prosecution and punishment where the conspiracy
cannot be said to constitute the same conduct as the substantive offense.
Several California cases have held under their similar statute that con-
spiracy is not a separate punishable offense. See, e.g., People v. Thomsen, 48
Cal. Rptr. 455 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). This result is consistent with their test
which focuses solely upon the intent and objective of the actor. See notes 58-60
supra and accompanying text.
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ing the police car's red lights and siren. In the process of running
a stop sign defendant struck -and killed a pedestrian in the cross
walk. Before finally being apprehended, defendant seriously in-
jured a police officer while attempting to escape on foot. The de-
fendant in this situation could be charged with speeding, refusing
to obey a police officer's lawful order, failure to keep to the right
of the road, going through a valid stop sign, reckless driving,
aggravated assault, end homicide. It is assumed for purposes of
discussion that all these offenses -arose out of a single unit of con-
duct within the meaning of section 609.035.75
A. CoNwvmcox oR AcQui AL FoR LssEn OTENSE,
If the defendant is charged in district court on a single count
or on a number of counts other than homicide, and conviction or
acquittal ensues, section 609.035 would bar a subsequent prose-
cution for the homicide. The prosecutor need not have chosen
which crimes to prosecute, since the joinder provision of section
609.035 expressly allows 'the state to bring all offenses arising out
of defendant's "conduct" within a single indictment." Defendant
should not be made to bear the burden of repeated trials, even
though the prosecutor's action permits him to escape prosecution
for the most severe offense.
B. WAivER oF SEcTIoN 609.035's PROTECTION
If, in the hypothetical suggested, the prosecutor had charged
all offenses, including homicide, in a single prosecution, and the
defendant requested a separate prosecution on some or all of the
less serious offenses, there is no sound reason why the statute
should prevent a further prosecution for the homicide. Although
75. This assumption appears reasonable since all the offenses were inci-
dental or necessary to the accomplishment of a common purpose to evade
the police and were closely Meated in time and space, therefore satisfying the
three factors used to define "conducL"
76. It should be noted that § 609.035 permits joinder only of offenses
arising out of the same unit of conduct. This seems to have been overlooked
in the court's dictum in State v. Reiland, s pra, note 56. There, after holding
that the two offenses did not arise out of a single behavioral incident, the court
stated: ". .. the problem presented in the case before us could not arise if both
the offenses were included in one prosecution stating each as separate counts, a
procedure expressly authorized by the statute."
77. See Note, 24 Mmw. L. REv. 522, 545-46 (1940). Once § 609.035 is




a literal reading of the statute would seem to compel this result,
the Minnesota court has held that the protection of -the section
is waived by "requesting a special kind of serialized prosecution." 78
This result appears reasonable since it leaves the defendant with
an option of defending all charges individually or together 9
C. GUILTY PLEA TO LESSER OFFENSES CELARGED
IN ONE PROSECUTION
If the hypothetical defendant facing all seven charges elected
to plead guilty on one or more counts, he might argue that this
conviction should bar the state from proceeding further against
him. However, section 609.035 should be construed to bar only
subsequent prosecutions, not continuation of a single prosecution
on multiple counts."' The Johnson result could have rested upon
this broader principle. The court could simply have held that
these actions did not sever the prosecution 2 since the "waiver" in
that ease was found to consist merely in defendant's making "no
plea" to the larger offense, requesting permission to plead on the
smaller one, and pleading guilty thereto.
D. WAIvEm Am GUrTY PLEA To LESSER O ENsEs CnaRGm
IN ONE PRosEcUTION-MU rTIPLE PUNISMVMNT
If the defendant charged with all seven violations procures a
separate prosecution on a lesser offense upon request and is con-
victed, or if he pleads guilty to a lesser offense, he may request
78. State v. Johnson, 141 N.W.2d 517, 525--26 (Minn. 1966).
79. The Johmon court emphasized that the defendant's conduct was "an
obvious attempt" to "become immune from further prosecution on the more
serious charge." Id. at 525. See generally Note, 24 Mmr-. L. Rnv. 522, 581-34
(1940). However, it would seem a defendant's request for serial prosecution
need not be motivated by bad faith before he can be found to have waived
his statutory protection.
80. A number of cases hold that a plea of guilty is equivalent to a con-
viction. See, e.g., People v. Mims, 186 Cal. App. 2d 828, 289 P.2d 539 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Goddard, 13 Mass. 455 (1816); Henry v. State, 97 Miss..
787, 58 So. 897 (1910); People ex rd Hunt v. Warden of New York City
Prison, 201 Misc. 406, 107 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1951).
81. See United States v. Goldman, 352 F2d 268 (3d Cir. 1965); People
v. Tideman, 57 Cal. 2d 574, 584, 870 P.d 1007, 1018, 21 Cal. Rptr. 207, 218
(1962).
82. Citing Tideman and Goldman, supra note 81, the court in Johmon
stated that in a single prosecution on multiple counts, "no plea or dismissal
of any offense charged will prevent the prosecution from continuing until
all offenses charged are disposed of." 141 N.W.2d at 526.
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immediate sentencing on that offense.8 It might be argued, how-
ever, that such sentencing would bar the court from imposing
additional punishment on any remaining charges."' On the other
hand, if the court defers sentencing until all the offenses have been
determined,s5 there is no punishment within the meaning of the
statute 'to bar subsequent sentencing on the remaining offenses.""
A strong argument can be made that application of the mul-
tiple punishment clause should not be based on whether the court
imposed a sentence on the lesser offense which would be equating
the sentence with the punishment. This appears to be unreason-
able, at least if the sentence is vacated before defendant serves
any of it, since it does not seem he is punished. If the sentence is
not vacated before he serves some or all of it, crediting punish-
ment actually served under one sentence to that imposed under
another may be sufficient to qualify as punishment "for only one
of such offenses." It has been asserted, "The intent of the section
is to ... [limit] the sentence to the maximum permitted for the
most 'serious crime committed. 18 7 Credit for punishment served
accomplishes this objective.8
E. CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO AN
ADDITIONAL OPENSE
Another problem is the effect section 609.035 should have in
the hypothetical situation if the victim of defendant's reckless
driving were to die only after defendant's conviction or acquittal
on a lesser offense. A number of courts, faced with similar situa-
tions, have held constitutional double jeopardy does not bar a
second prosecution for the greater crime.89 The rationale is that,
at the time of the earlier prosecution "the offence now prosecuted
83. It is within -the court's discretion to determine when a sentence is to
be imposed. See Mmx. STAT. ANN. § 609.095-.16 (1964).
84. The court in Johnson recognized that a waiver of statutory protec-
tion against multiple prosecution need not constitute a waiver of multiple
punishment protection. 141 N.W.2d at 526.
85. This was done by the trial judge in Johnson. Id. at 520.
86. See People v. Tideman, 57 Cal. 2d 574, 370 P.2d 1007, 21 Cal. Rptr.
207. (1962).
87. 40 Mmw. STAT. ANN. 59 (1964).
88. If mere sentencing were held to bar further punishment, the prose-
cutor still might have an incentive to obtain convictions on remaining counts.
See generally Note, 17 HASTINGs L.3. 53, 66-67 (1965). For example, addi-
tional convictions might enhance the penalty if defendant is later convicted
under a multiple offender statute, see notes 145-46 infra and accompanying
text, and convictions on traffic counts might result in suspension or revoca-
tion of a driver's license. See Hmw. STAT. §§ 171.71-.18 (1961).
89. See authorities cited in note 29 supra.
ills
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was not... complete and was not capable of judicial determina-
tion."' The literal language of the Minnesota statute does not
provide an exception in this instance to its bar against multiple
prosecution. However, such an exception can reasonably be read
into the statute. The effect of the clauses barring multiple prose-
cutions and authorizing joinder of offenses is to establish a rule of
compulsory joinder for offenses arising out of the same conduct. 1
It would be unreasonable to conclude that such a rule may be in-
voked for failure to join offenses which are not complete at the
time of prosecution.
It might also be argued that the state should not be penalized
for accommodating the defendant with a speedy trial on other
offenses before it is clear whether the victim will live or die; by
asserting his right to a speedy trial on lesser offenses, the defend-
ant can be said to have waived his protection from subsequent
prosecution for -the homicide. 2 This approach has certain diffi-
culties, however. First, it involves circular reasoning. If the statute
were held to be a bar to -a second prosecution after the victim's
death, pre-trial delay to determine the fate of the victim would
probably be considered justified and, in the absence of -actual
prejudice to the accused, not an infringement of his speedy trial
right9 Second, it might lead to inconsistent results. General waiv-
er principles appear to apply only to the defendant who actually
requested an immediate trial on lesser offenses, even though the
prosecutor likely would give all defendants an immediate trial
rather than risk infringing speedy trial rights. Because of these
difficulties, the direct approach of reading an exception into the
statute seems preferable.
Under either approach, the defendant still should be able to
rely upon the statutory protection against multiple punishment.
Such protection should require that any punishment served under
the earlier convictions be credited against that imposed for the
homicide9
F. MuLTiPLE Vic~nvs: Co~NucT As AN OFF E
AGAI sT TWO oR MoiE PEnsoNs
If the hypothetical defendant had struck and killed two persons
90. Commonwealth v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25, 26 (1869).
91. The rule is compulsory insofar as failure to join offenses bars subsequent
prosecutions.
92. See notes 78-79 mupra and accompanying text; cf. Note, 24 Mmxnq.
L. REu. 522, 546 (1940).
93. See generally Note, 61 YATx LJ. 1208 (1955).
94. See notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text.
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in the cross walk, the problem would arise whether separate
prosecution and punishment could be had for each death. The
authorities are divided on the issue of constitutional double jeop-
ardy in this area.9 Formerly, Minnesota took the position that
the constitutional rule does not bar successive prosecution0 8
Since the enactment of section 609.035, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has not considered the effect of offenses against multiple
victims. Under the construction given a similar statute in Cali-
fornia, however, a defendant may be tried and punished con-
secutively for offenses against different victims arising from the
same conduct. 97 This result is consistent with the wording of the
California statute, which applies when "an act ... is made punish-
able in different ways by different provzsion of [the] Code."99
Several deaths or injuries caused, for example, by the explosion of
a bomb placed on an airplane naturally are made punishable by
the same code provision. The protection of section 609.035, on
the other hand, is available "if a person's conduct constitutes
more than one offense under the laws of thi8 state."99 Therefore a
literal application of the section would preclude multiple prosecu-
tion or punishment where a single unit of conduct produces either
the same offense or different offenses against multiple victims.
The contrary result reached by the California courts seems
based upon a notion that defendant's culpability should determine
his protection from multiple prosecution and punishment. Ex-
plaining the California Supreme Cour's position allowing cumula-
tive punishment, Chief Justice Traynor stated:
The purpose of the protection against multiple punishment is to in-
sure that the defendant's punishment will be commensurate with his
criminal liability. A defendant who commits an act of violence with the
intent to harm more than one person or by a means likely to cause
harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant who harms
only one person.100
95. See authorities cited in note 28 supra.
96. See State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, N.W. 858 (1937) (two deaths
from auto collision).
97. See Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960)
(separate punishment for an attempt to murder two victims by arson); People
v. Branon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 288 Pac. 88 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (acquittal for
assault with intent to murder wife does not bar prosecution for killing by-
stander by same shot).
98. CAL. PFN. CODE § 654. (Emphasis added.) The California Supreme Court
declined to rest its result in Neal on this language. 55 Cal. 2d at 18 n.1, 857
P.2d at 843 n.1, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 611 n.1.
99. Alrw. STAT. ANN. § 609.035 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
100. Neal v. State, 55 Cal.2d 11, 90, 357 P.2d 839, 844, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607,
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This notion has also influenced decisions of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court.01° Preoccupation with defendant's culpability, how-
ever, tends to obscure the issues posed by a claim of statutory
protection. With respect to multiple prosecution protection, the
heinousness of the crimes allegedly committed has little relevance.
The burden of defending repeated trials clearly is no less because
the charges are grave 'and the state has no legitimate reason not
to join offenses. Admittedly, different considerations bear on the
question of punishment, which traditionally has been associated
with culpability. However, section 609.035 makes no distinction
between multiple prosecution and multiple punishment,1 2 and
the gravity of the charges in itself provides no basis for making
such a distinction. In support of this position is the theory that
the objectives of the criminal law are deterrence and rehabilitation
rather than punishment.1 3 The threat of additional punishment
for victimizing more than one person is not likely to deter the
criminal who risks punishment for victimizing a single person.1°4
Moreover, flexible sentencing procedures would still permit reser-
vation of maximum punishments for the most heinous crimes,
such as crimes against multiple victims.
G. PRosEcuToI iN STATE AND Mumcipi CouRTs
Additional problems would arise if the hypothetical defendant
were first tried in municipal (or justice) court on some of the lesser
charges, and then prosecuted in district court for the homicide.
First, since the municipal court lacks jurisdiction over felonies,105
it might be argued that its trial of statutory misdemeanors should
612 (1960). Although the Advisory Committee Comment cited Neal as repre-
sentative of the law § 609.035 was intended to incorporate, 40 MmN. STAT.
ArNu. 58 (1964), it seems clear this incorporation was limited to the broadness
of Neal's approach in defining a single unit of conduct and not as authority for
creating an exception to § 609.035 where defendant's conduct is an offense
against multiple victims.
101. See, e.g., State v. Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 54, 273 N.W. 353, 358
(1937).
102. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
103. Modem correctional theories assumedly have different objectives
than those prevailing when the notorious traitor William Wallace was report-
edly "drawn for treason, hanged for robbery and homicide and disembowelled
for sacrilege, beheaded as an outlaw and quartered for divers depredations."
See Note, 75 YALE LJ. 262, 300 (1965).
104. This is particularly true of multiple murders, since a single murder
carries the maximum punishment of life imprisonment.
105. Mimr. STAT. § 488.04 Subd. (5)(a)(1) (1961). Accord, § 633.02 (1961)
(justice court).
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not bar a prosecution in district court for felonies arising out of
the same conduct. Second, if the trial in municipal court was
limited to ordinance violations, it might be argued that it should
not bar a prosecution in district court for statutory offenses arising
out of the same conduct, either because ordinance violations are
not "offenses" within the meaning of section 609.035, or because
defendant's conduct constitutes an offense against two sovereigns.
1. Limited Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts
A majority of courts have 'accepted the view that an accused
is not placed in jeopardy for an offense until he is brought before
a tribunal having the 'authority to determine his guilt or innocence
of that offense.106 Thus, a second trial for offenses arising out of
the same conduct involved in an earlier prosecution would not
be barred by constitutional double jeopardy, provided the first
court lacked jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the second
prosecution. In Jurisdictions following the same evidence test,10 7
this rule is easily justified. The first court's lack of jurisdiction
simply establishes that defendant was not formerly placed in
jeopardy for the same offense. Under section 609.035, on the other
hand, the relevant question is whether defendant was formerly
prosecuted for an offense arising out of the same conduct. Thus,
reading an exception into the section for prosecutions in municipal
court would involve an extension of the general rule.
Those who would favor such an extension point to the difficul-
ties inherent in requiring coordination among state and local prose-
cuting authorities.0 8 A municipal court trial might be undertaken
without an appreciation of its possible effect, and in some cases
local authorities may be consciously unwilling to forego prosecu-
tion. Once prosecution in municipal court is initiated, the effect of
section 609.035 could be avoided only by having the charges dis-
missed before conviction or acquittal.1 9 If local authorities fail to
106. See note 31 8upra and accompanying text.
107. See notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text.
108. See 49 Mmn,. L. REv. 738, 743 (1965).
109. Section 609.035 bars prosecution only after conviction or acquittal
in an earlier action. However, it should be noted that constitutional double
jeopardy protection may attach in the first action when a jury is empanelled,
see, e.g., Cornero v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931), or, in court-
tried cases, when the first evidence is presented, see, e.g., Markiewicz v. Black,
138 Colo. 128, 330 P.2d 539 (1958). Thus, a dismissal of the municipal court
action may be deemed equivalent to an acquittal for purposes of barring sub-
sequent prosecutions in district court for the same offense. See Boswell v.
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cooperate, the state prosecutor could attempt to secure an earlier
conviction in district court, but with little prospect for success.
Assuming the joinder provision of section 609.035 would not bar
concurrent trials for offenses arising out of the same conduct, it
seems likely the misdemeanor trial in municipal court would be
completed long before a felony trial in district court. Moreover
the defendant could bar prosecution in district court by pleading
guilty to the lesser offenses in municipal court."0 Since he did not
request separate prosecutions, his guilty plea should not be
deemed a waiver of the statute's protection."'
These difficulties, however, do not appear to be insurmount-
able."" And it is more appropriate to place the burden of securing
effective cooperation among prosecuting authorities on the state
than to burden the defendant with multiple prosecutions for
offenses arising out of the same conduct.
2. Ordinance Violations
(a) As Offenses
Section 609.035 applies "if a person's conduct constitutes more
than one offense under the laws of this state.""' There are strong
indications that "offense" is intended to mean statutory crimes,
and does not include ordinance violations." 4 This view was adopted
in City of Bloomington v. Kossow,"15 although the holding of the
case was expressly limited to non-traffic ordinances which do not
proscribe conduct for which a penalty is provided by state law." 6
State v. Hoben,"7 strongly suggests that the protection of sec-
tion 609.035 should be available if the earlier prosecution was for
violation of traffic ordinances subject to the uniformity provision
of section 169.03:118
State, 111 Ind. 47, 49, 11 N.E. 788, 789-90 (1887). It might be argued further
that when constitutional jeopardy has attached, -the policy embodied in §
609.035 requires a behavior-oriented test for determining what is the "same
offense."
110. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
112. See 79 EL41v. L. REv. 433, 435 (1965).
113. MmN. STAT. ANN. § 609.035 (1964).
114. See MmN. STAT. "Aow . § 609.02(1) (1964); Pirsig, Comment to §§
609.02, 609.035, 40 MNN. STAT. Amr. 42, 58 (1964).
115. 269 linn. 467, 131 N.W.2d 206 (1964).
116. Id. at 470, 131 N.W.2d at 208.
117. 256 Alnn. 486, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959).
118.
The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable and uniform
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As we interpret § 169.03, it was the intention of the legislature that
the application of its provisions should be uniform throughout the state
both as to penalties and procedures, and requires a municipality to
utilize state criminal procedure in the prosecution of the act covered by
§ 169.03.... When a municipality undertakes such prosecution, it
must, therefore, to insure uniformity of treatment, do so in a criminal
prosecution which affords the defendant all the protection of criminal
procedure including the right of trial by jury and immunity from
double punishment. 119
On their facts, both Kossow and Hoben leave open the question
whether violation of a non-traffic ordinance covering a subject
for which a penalty is provided under state statute is an "offense"
within section 609.035.&10 Prior to the adoption of the section, the
court held that in this situation prosecuting and punishing de-
fendant under both the statute and the ordinance does not violate
constitutional double jeopardy.'2' This result was criticized in
Hoben:
This apparent disregard of Mlirn. Const. art. 1, § 7, which is designed
to protect the citizens from double punishment for the same offense,
seems to find support in the doubtful theory that the municipality and
the state are in a sense independent and sovereign units of govern-
ment analogous to the state and Federal relationship. 122
The court suggested that a more satisfactory approach would be
to determine whether the municipal ordinance regulated subjects
throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipal-
ities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or
regulaton in conflict with the provisions of this chapter unless expressly
authorized herein. Local authorities may adopt traffic regulations
which are not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter;, provided,
that when any local ordinance regulating traffic covers the same sub-
ject for which a penalty is provided for in this chapter, then the penalty
provided for violation of said local ordinance shall be identical with the
penalty provided for in this chapter for the same offense.
MmnW. STAT. § 169.03 (1961).
119. 256 .inn. at 444, 98 N.W.2d at 818-19. See also State v. Friswold,
263 lnn. 130, 116 N.W.2d 270 (1962); State v. Moosbrugger, 263 Minn. 56,
116 N.W.2d 68 (1962); State ex e. Pidgeon v. Hall, 261 Ainn. 248, 111
N.W.2d 472 (1961); City of St. Paul v. Ulmer, 261 Mlnn. 178, 111 N.W.2d
612 (1961).
120. In Kossow, the ordinance violation was being drunk in public. There
is no similar statutory offense. In Hobim, the ordinance violation was driving
while intoxicafed.
121. See State v. Cavett, 171 linn. 505, 214 N.W. 479 (1927); State
v. Lee, 29 Minn. 445, 13 N.W. 913 (1882); State v. Oleson, 26 minn. 507, 5
N.W. 959 (1880).
122. 256 Minn. at 439, 98 N.W.2d at 816.
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of strictly local concern or subjects related to the protection of
the state as a whole.' Thus, the defendant who has been prose-
cuted for violation of any city ordinance regulating a subject of
statewide concern would be entitled to the protection of former
jeopardy and section 609.035.24
California courts faced with this question have taken a broader
view of the statutory protection. Despite statutory language re-
ferring to "different provisions of this Code,"'' 5 they have held
that prosecution under any ordinance bars prosecution under a
statute for offenses based upon the same conduct' 20 Such a con-
clusion could be reached more easily under section 609.035, which
refers to 'laws of this state.' 2 7
(b) As Offenses Against the Law of a Different Jurisdiction
If a particular ordinance violation is deemed an "offense" with-
in section 609.035, it still might be argued that separate prosecu-
tion and punishment for statutory offenses arising out of the
same conduct should be allowed. The argument, based upon the
fact that defendant's conduct offends the laws of more than one
jurisdiction, has been adopted by several courts, including the
Minnesota Supreme Court,128 as an exception to the constitutional
double jeopardy rule.' 29 This exception has been criticized, 3 and
the criticism seems especially justified where defendant's single
unit of conduct violates the laws of both a state and municipality:
1S. Id. at 442-44, 98 N.W.2d at 817-19; see State v. Ketterer, 248 Minn.
178, 79 N.W.2d 136 (1956).
12. See JoNEs, MNNESOTA CrtmnmqTA PaocEDuRE § 85 (2d ed. 1964):
These ;safeguards [former jeopardy and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt] are applicable whenever -there is a prosecution relating to the
dignity of the state as a whole, as distinguished from prosecutions on a
local level for violations of regulatory, licensing, zoning, or other ordi-
nances relating peculiarly to the local scene.
125. CAL. PEN. CoDE § 654. (Emphasis added.)
196. See People v. Manago, 230 Cal. App. 2d 645, 41 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Dist.
Ot. App. 1964); People v. Williams, 207 Cal. App. Rd Supp. 912, 24 Cal. Rptr.
922 (1962). In Manago, the court stated:
Although Section 654 ostensibly relates only to punishment or pros-
ecution under two provisions of "this [i.e., Penal] Code," the rule also
applies to an act made punishable by provisions of different codes
.... An appellate department decision . . has held that Section 654
applies also to a municipal ordinance. This rule seems consistent with
the intent and purpose of the section, and we adopt it.
R30 Cal. App. 2d at 647,41 Cal. Rptr. ,at 262.
197. MIN. STAT. ANN. § 609.035 (1964).
128. See cases cited note 121 8upra.
129. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
180. See Note, 24 ANh. L. Rlv. 522, 540-43 (1940).
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The principle objection to the rule, even were it to be conceded that
prosecutions by two sovereigns such as a state and the federal govern-
ment do not violate double jeopardy principles, is that a municipality
is not a sovereign power at all but is merely an instrumentality of the
state .... 18
Limited to situations in which each unit of government has a dis-
tinct reason for prosecuting the offense against its laws, the rule
would have some justification. However, an exception to the oper-
ation of section 609.035 should not be made for all ordinance
violations.u 2
If all prosecutions for ordinance violations were excluded from
the coverage of section 609.035, it might be ,argued that subse-
quent prosecutions for statutory offenses should be barred by
section 609.045 which states: "If an act or omission constitutes
a crime under both the laws of this state and the laws of another
jurisdiction, a conviction or acquittal of such crime in the other
jurisdiction bars prosecution for the crime in this state."'183 The
legislative history of this provision indicates that municipalities
were not intended to be included in "other jurisdictions."'3 4 How-
ever, a contrary argument could be based upon early cases which
asserted ,that, for purposes of constitutional double jeopardy,
municipalities and the state are separate jurisdictions analogous
to states and the federal government. 85 Taken -together, sections
609.035 'and 609.045 appear to reflect a state policy against prose-
cuting a defendant who has been tried anywhere for the same
offense.186
H. APPROPRIATE SENTENCE OR JUDGMENT
Section 609.035 expressly prohibits multiple or cumulative
punishment,3  but it does not determine what the ultimate judg-
181. Id. at 541-42. See text acompanying note 122 supra.
132. California courts have not recognized this exception to their similar
statute. See People v. Manago, 230 Cal. App. 2d. 645, 41 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1964);
People v. Williams, 207 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 912,24 Cal. Rptr. 922 (1962).
133. AmIN. STAT. ANN. § 609.045 (1964).
134. See Advisory Committee Comment, 40 MmNr. STAT. ANN. 69 (1964).
135. See cases cited note 121 supra.
136. If municipalities are deemed "other jurisdictions" the question will
arise whether -the term "act or omission" in § 609.045 is -to be construed as it
was in § 610.21. See notes 32-45 3upra and accompanying text. Having ac-
knowledged that the Advisory Committee's purpose in drafting § 609.035 was
to effectuate the original purpose of § 610.21, see State v. Johnson, 141 N.W.2d
517, 524 (Minn 1966); City of Bloomington v. Kossow, 269 Mlnn. 467, 469,
I1 N.Wd 206, 208 (1964), the court should be willing to give a behavior-
oriented construction to "act or omission."
137. An additional safeguard against multiple punishments is found in
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ment or sentence should be if defendant is convicted of several
offenses in a single prosecution. Three different approaches have
been followed under California's similar statute. A few cases
allowed the convictions to stand and the sentences were imposed
to run concurrently.B This method of sentencing, it was argued,
was tantamount to cumulative punishment because it increased
the penalty by delaying eligibility for parole.139 In response to this
argument, lesser convictions were vacated in some cases.' 4 This
sentencing procedure, however, created a new problem: .
[I]f [the trial court] dismisses the count carrying the lesser penalty,
and the conviction on the remaining count should 'be reversed on ap-
peal, the defendant would stand with no conviction at all.... [This
method] incurs the risk of letting a defendant escape altogether
. . .141
Apparently the present method of sentencing in California is to
mm. STAT. ANN. § 609.15 (194), which provides:
Subdivision 1. When separate sentences of imprisonment are imposed
on a defendant for two or more crimes, whether charged in a single in-
dictment or information or separately, or when a person who is under
sentence of imprisonment in this state is being sentenced to imprison-
ment for another crime committed prior to or while subject to such
former sentence, the court in the later sentences shall specify whether
the sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively. If the court does
not so specify, the sentences shall run concurrently.
Subd. 2. I the court specifies that the sentence shall run consecutively,
the total of the terms of imprisonment imposed, other than a term of
imprisonment for life, shall not exceed 40 years. If all of the sentences
are for misdemeanors the total of the terms of imprisonment shall not
exceed one year; if for gross misdemeanors the total of such terms shall
not exceed three years.
138. E.g., People v. Craig, 17 Cal. 2d 458, 110 P.2d 403 (1941); People v.
Kynebte, 15 Cal. 2d 781, 104 P.2d 794 (1940); People v. Thompson, 18 Cal.
App. 2d 4, 284 P.2d 39 (1955).
139. People v. Quinn, 61 Cal. 2d 551, 393 P.2d 705, 89 Cal. Rptr. 898
(1964); People v. Brown, 49 Ca]. 2d 577, 593, 820 P.2d 5, 15 (1958); People
v. Branch, 119 Cal. App. 2d 490, 496, 260 P.2d 27, 31 (1958). In the Quinn
Case the California Supreme Court stated, "Section 654 of the Penal Code
proscribes double punishment of a criminal act that constitutes more than one
crime, and concurrent sentences are double punishment." 61 Cal. 2d at 555,
893 P.2d at 708,89 Cal. Rptr. at 896. (Emphasis added.)
The New York courts, in interpreting their multiple prosecution and mul-
tiple punishment statute have rejected this argument and allow concurrent
sentences. People e rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259, 140 N.E.2d 282,
159 N.YS.2d 208 (1957).
140. People v. Logan, 41 Cal. 2d 279, 260 P.2d 20 (1953); People v.
Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.Rd 1, cert. denied., 840 U.S. 879 (1950); People
v. Kehoe, 83 Cal. 2d 711, 204 P.2d 821, cert. dazied, 338 U.S. 884 (1949).
141. People v. Niles, 227 Cal. App. 2d 749, 756, 39 Cal. Rptr. 11, 15 (1964).
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sustain all convictions and vacate the sentences of the lesser
offenses.' 42
The Minnesota Advisory Committee's comment and dictum
in State V. Johnson,14 provide support for a method similar to
that presently used by the California courts. The Advisory Com-
mittee comment states:
As drawn, the recommended section will not prevent a single indict-
ment from charging several offenses arising out of the same conduct
and obtaining convictions for any or all of them, but a sentence may
be imposed for only one of them which may be for the highest sentence
which any one of them carries.j 44
Although the comment refers to only one sentence being imposed,
rather than all sentences being imposed and all but the highest
vacated, it is doubtful the drafters intended to dispose of such
a technical distinction in this general comment.
Allowing the convictions to stand on the record may adversely
affect defendant both as to the fixing of his term by the Adult
Corrections CommissionU4 5 and as to the application of the multi-
142. See People v. Jones, 211 Cal. App. 2d 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1962);
People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748, 376 P.2d 449, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1962).
In McFarland, the court stated:
The appropriate procedure, therefore, is to eliminate the effect of the
judgment as to the lesser offense insofar as the penalty alone is con-
cered..... It is true that there are cases which have, without qual-
fication, reversed the "judgment of conviction" as to the lesser count,
thus apparently eliminating the effect of the judgment with respect
to conviction as well as punishment.
Id. at 763, 376 P.2d at 457, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 481. (Emphasis added.)
143. 141 N.W.2d 517 (Alnn. 1966). Although not concerned with the
problem of the appropriate sentence under § 609.035, the court indicated its
agreement with an approach allowing convictions on all violations resulting
from defendant's conduct but limiting punishment to a single sentence:
[The Statute] necessarily contemplates multiple convictions. . .. As
stated in the comments of the committee, the purpose of the statute
prior to and after revision is 'to limit punishment to a single sentence
when a single ehavioral incident resulted in the violation of more
than one criminal statute." The policy underlying this objective appears
fo be that, where the statute is applicable and defendant is convicted
of multiple offenses, as a practical matter a single sentence will neces-
sarily take into account all violations, and imposing up to the maximum
punishment for the most serious offense will include punishment for all
offenses.
Id. at 521-22.
144. 40 MfrN. STAT. ANN. 58 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
145. See Afmi. STAT. ANN. § 609.12 (1964), which provides that the
Adult Corrections Commission is to determine when "the granting of parole
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ple offender statute by the court.4 6 This is as it should be, insofar
as these bodies consider the additional convictions solely as indicia
of the gravity of the offense for which defendant is incarcerated.
For these authorities -to consider the mere number of convictions
arising out of a single unit of conduct would be inconsistent with
modem correctional theories as well as the policy underlying sec-
tion 609.035. As a practical matter, however, both the Adult
Corrections Commission and the court would be able to learn
about defendant's convictions regardless of the fact they were
dismissed by the trial court.14T Therefore it seems preferable to let
the convictions stand on the record and openly rely on the good
judgment of the authorities rather than to adopt a less sound
technique which requires the same reliance.
CONCLUSION
Section 609.035 represents an attempt to implement the poli-
cies underlying constitutional double jeopardy provisions. Its
dominant purpose is to reverse the course of decisions equating
acts or omissions with the substantive offenses committed. The
behavior-oriented approach embodied in the new statute will have
the salutary effect of expanding protection against multiple
prosecution and punishment.
This Note has considered a number of problems in the applica-
tion of the statute yet to be resolved by Minnesota courts. While
some of these problems -for example, the effect of municipal
prosecutions - are not without difficulty, the policy expressed in
the statute provides some guidance for their determination. Other
problems, however, deserve further consideration by the legisla-
ture. For example, now that an -accused may be prosecuted only
once for offenses arising out of his conduct, it may be appropriate
or discharge would be most conducive to his rehabilitation and would be in
the public interest."
146. MmrN. STAT. ANx. § 609.155 (1964). In determining when § 609.155
is applicable to extend the term of imprisonment of a defendant who has
previously been convicted of one or more felonies, findings are made by the
court as required by MwN. STAT. ANN. § 609.16 (1964). The court in making
its findings under the latter section is required thereby to determine whether
"an extended term of imprisonment is required for his rehabilitation or for
the public safety."
147. Mnmm. STAT. AwK. § 609.16 (1964) expressly allows the courts, in
determining the appropriate term of punishment for the multiple offender, to
consider among other things "the evidence at the trial and the presentence
report."
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to authorize retrial after a 'successful state appeal from a judg-
ment of acquittal. The policy of section 609.035 would not appear
to be offended by a single trial free from error. While such a
result might be read into the statute- conviction or acquittal
literally bars prosecution only for "any other" offense -there is
no indication that the legislature intended to make this significant
change in the law.
Another problem deserving further consideration is the distinc-
tion between multiple prosecution and multiple punishment. While
distinct policies underlie the two protections, the statute applies
the same standard of unitary conduct to each. Thus, a court is
not left free to extend one protection and not the other where
policy seems to dictate that result. In such situations a court
may be inclined to deny both protections.
Finally, the importance of coordinated efforts to implement
the statute at the -trial level should be emphasized. To appellate
courts it often appears that double jeopardy protection is being
invoked by guilty defendants who would escape punishment com-
mensurate with ,their crimes simply because of innocent mistakes
at the trial level. In the past, courts have strained to avoid this
result, at the expense of consistency. It is clear, however, that the
statute can be implemented by following proper procedures in
prosecuting and sentencing, without sacrificing any legitimate
state interest. Thus, it is to be 'hoped that the effects of the statute
will be appreciated by trial judges and prosecuting authorities
as well as defense attorneys. The long-range role of the Minnesota
Supreme Court in implementing the statute should be to enforce
strict adherence to its terms.
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